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Abstract. While not all interest groups participate in coalitions, some groups join multiple coalitions 
to form portfolios of coalition memberships. We test hypotheses that the composition of coalition 
portfolios increases the influence of interest groups over public policy when: (1) the number of 
coalitions in a group’s portfolio gets larger; (2) the average size of the coalitions in a group’s 
portfolio gets larger; and (3) a group’s portfolio improves its position within the overall network of 
coalitions. We evaluate these hypotheses using a study of 115 interest groups involved in the debate 
over the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. The results support hypothesis three; groups gain 
influence over the policy process when their coalition portfolios increase the extent to which they 
are situated between other groups in the coalition network. However, the ability of groups to 
proactively augment their coalitional betweenness may be muted by feedback in the policy process. 
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 An interest group coalition exists whenever two or more interest groups collaborate in 
advocating their public policy agendas. Working together in coalition is one of the most common 
tactics that interest groups use in attempting to influence the policy process (Baumgartner, Berry, 
Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech 2009; Hojnacki, Kimball, Baumgartner, Berry, and Leech 2012; 
Scholzman and Tierney 1986). Interest groups turn to coalitions as a mechanism to pool resources 
(Hula 1999), to demonstrate to policymakers that they have resolved their internal differences and 
achieved a consensus on a position (Mahoney 2008; Nelson and Yackee 2012), and to aggregate 
political intelligence (Heaney 2006). Interest groups sometimes choose not to participate in 
coalitions when they view the costs of participation – such as the need to compromise with coalition 
partners, reduced autonomy, and risks that the group will suffer from the coalition’s missteps – as 
outweighing the potential benefits of collaboration (Browne 1990; Hojnacki 1997; Holyoke 2011; 
Wilson 1995). Nonetheless, coalition participation has grown in recent years because the increasingly 
crowded universe of interest groups makes it difficult for individual groups to attain prominence 
when acting alone (Leech, Baumgartner, La Pira, and Semanko 2005; Salisbury 1990). 
 Empirical research on coalitions generally focuses on whether or not interest groups use the 
coalition strategy at all (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki 1997; Mahoney 2008), how much 
they participate within a given coalition (e.g., Hojnacki 1998; Hula 1999; Strolovitch 2007), the size 
and stability of a given coalition (e.g., Holyoke 2011; Nelson and Yackee 2012), or else provides in-
depth analysis of strategies and tactics within a small number of coalitions (e.g., Levi and Murphy 
2006; Heaney and Rojas 2008; Hula 2005). Each of these approaches conceptualizes interest group 
strategy vis-à-vis a single coalition or toward coalitions generically. In doing so, they provide valuable 
insight into the relationship between interest groups and coalitions.  
 In the everyday world of lobbying and interest group politics, advocates are confronted with 
opportunities to join, participate in, or lead multiple coalitions that touch on aspects of their policy 
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agendas. This multi-coalitional reality, however, is not reflected in the extant literature. While it is 
certainly true that some interest groups choose to join only one coalition or to eschew coalitional 
involvement entirely, it is more often that groups are challenged with finding a balance among 
multiple coalitional involvements. Should an interest group become involved in a coalition for every 
issue on its agenda? Or, should it be more selective by focusing only on coalitions engaged on a few 
of the group’s core issues? Perhaps joining a variety of coalitions is a way for a group to amplify the 
value of its limited lobbying resources. Or, instead, is it possible that too many coalitional 
involvements weigh down a group’s staff with the concerns of other organizations? Different 
interest groups answer these questions for themselves in different ways. Yet the extant literature 
offers little guidance on how groups make these decisions or what consequences they have. 
 In order to account for interest group involvement in multiple coalitions, we introduce the 
concept of the coalition portfolio, which is the set of all coalitions within a given area of public policy in which an 
interest group participates at a particular point in time. The portfolio concept recognizes that interest groups 
may have a wide variety of coalition strategies depending on the mix of coalitions that they join. 
Moreover, coalition portfolios evolve over time as coalitions form and dissolve, and as political 
conditions adjust over the course of the policy process.   
This article addresses the question of how differences among interest groups in their 
coalition portfolios affect their ability to influence policy. We examine three potential explanations 
for the relationship between coalition portfolios and influence: (1) Influence expands as the number 
of coalitions in a group’s portfolio gets larger; (2) Influence expands as the average size of the 
coalitions in a group’s portfolio gets larger; and (3) Influence expands as an interest group’s portfolio 
improves its position within the overall network of coalitions. We assess these explanations using 
data from a study of interest group advocacy surrounding the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. 
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This article proceeds, first, by developing a theory of coalition portfolios and articulating our 
hypotheses for how the composition of a portfolio allows interest groups to influence the policy 
process. Second, we review the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and explain how it provides an 
appropriate context for testing hypotheses derived from our theory. Third, we explain our research 
methods for gathering data on coalition participation, interest group influence, and other aspects of 
coalition politics. Fourth, we explain our empirical models and report the results of statistical 
analysis using negative binomial regression and ordinary least squares regression. Fifth, we consider 
how the shifting context of the policy process from enactment to implementation affects the nature 
of coalition portfolios. The article concludes by considering the implications of our work for 
coalition politics and the participation of interest groups in the policy process. 
A Theory of Coalition Portfolios 
 The coalition is a highly flexible form of organization available to interest groups. Interest 
groups may establish an ad hoc coalition for the purpose for addressing a single, non-recurring 
policy event, such as a coalition to defeat an amendment to one particular bill. Or, they may 
establish a coalition to engage a wide-ranging set of issues that can be resolved only over a number 
of decades, such as the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights (2012). Coalitions may 
be largely informal – sometimes based only on a verbal understanding among participants – or may 
be relatively formalized – perhaps having bylaws and paid staff. Coalitions vary in their tactical 
specialties, with some concentrating on lobbying and others focusing on grassroots mobilization, 
amicus curiae briefs (Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson 2011), get-out-the-vote drives, or media 
advertising (Boatright 2007). Coalitions may be large or small, be hierarchical or egalitarian, 
concentrate on one issue or many, and have a membership that is homogenous or heterogeneous. 
 Given the diversity of forms that coalitions may take, interest groups may use coalitions for a 
variety of purposes. An interest group may join one coalition to help advertise its issue positions to 
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the public, a second coalition to lobby on an important provision of a pending bill, and a third 
coalition to advance its interests in the courts. In doing so, it assembles a coalition portfolio. 
Crafting a coalition portfolio not only requires a group to weigh the costs and benefits of 
coalition participation for each coalition that it considers joining (Hojnacki 1997), but also requires 
the group to factor in how memberships in diverse coalitions interact with one another. Do the 
functions performed by different coalitions complement or contradict one another? Are coalitional 
memberships redundant? Or, do they ally the group with an unmanageable set of partners? Further, 
each coalition membership taxes the interest group’s limited staff resources such that participation in 
one new coalition may imply less effort devoted to other coalitions in its portfolio. If an interest 
group becomes embroiled in a coalition that does not serve its interests well, then its attention may 
be diverted generally from other advocacy activities, not only those related to coalitions. Indeed, any 
coalition portfolio may contain both valuable and toxic assets. 
 While interest groups form coalitions to advance their own goals, coalitions also serve the 
interests of policymakers. Coalitions signal to policymakers that a set of interest groups – the 
members of the coalition – have reached a consensus on the issue at hand (Nelson and Yackee 
2012). This signal reduces the transaction costs to policymakers of dealing with the groups in the 
coalition. Rather than having separate meetings with a wide array of groups, policymakers can meet 
with a subset of relevant groups at once. Since the groups have already worked out their differences 
– on one issue at least – the policymakers may be able to avoid becoming embroiled in internecine 
squabbles. If the policymaker and the coalition have similar goals, then the coalition may subsidize 
the policymaker’s attention to the coalition’s issue (Hall and Deardorff 2006) by doing work that 
might normally be required of legislative staff, serving as a clearing house for information on the 
topic, mobilizing grassroots activists, or exerting pressure on other policymakers that may not be 
aligned with the coalition’s position.  Just as an interest group may benefit from joining a single 
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coalition that serves the interests of policymakers well (Leifeld and Schneider 2012), so too we 
expect that an interest group may benefit from constructing a coalition portfolio that meets 
policymakers’ needs.  
Coalition portfolios are modified over the course of the policy process both because 
individual interest groups change their strategies and because of shifts in the overall political 
environment that are beyond the control over individual groups. As public policies change, they feed 
back onto the policy process in ways that alter the overall configuration of interests (Beland 2010; 
Browne 1990; Campbell 2003, 2011; Schattschneider 1935; Skocpol 1992). Paul Pierson (1993, p. 
601) explains that: 
Not only do public policies create incentives for interest group activities, they may 
also provide resources that make that activity easier. The political influence of groups 
varies dramatically; some are central actors in the development of policy, while 
others are ineffectual, forced to accept gains and losses determined elsewhere. Public 
policies can clearly "feed back" into politics in this respect, too. Policies can have an 
effect on the resources of groups and the ability of groups to bring those resources 
to bear on decision makers. 
Patashnik (2008, p. 30) expands on Pierson’s argument by noting that policy feedback affects 
interest group politics by creating constituencies, which may be accomplished by increasing or 
decreasing political cohesion among interests, altering the cognitive mindsets of preexisting groups, 
or tarnishing the public image of a group. These dynamics may prompt the realignment of 
coalitions, sparking the formation of new coalitions or pushing other coalitions out of the policy 
domain. Thus, the exact composition of coalition portfolios depends on timing, since the coalitional 
options available to groups vary over the different stages of the policy process. 
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 In light of these considerations, the question arises as to how an interest group’s coalition 
portfolio affects its ability to influence the policy process. Does an interest group expand its 
influence the most by simply joining as many coalitions as it can, or does it benefit more by joining 
one set as opposed to another? Can an interest group proactively increase its policy influence by 
modifying its coalitional portfolio?   
We consider three possible answers to these questions. The first possible answer functions 
as the null hypothesis. We hypothesize that as an interest group joins more coalitions, it exerts more 
influence over the policy process. This notion is implicit in much of the interest groups literature 
that assumes that groups join coalitions when their benefits outweigh their costs (e.g., Hojnacki 
1997). If this hypothesis is true, then interest groups further their objectives any time they add 
coalitions to their portfolio. Moreover, if this view captures the principal way in which portfolios 
matter, then a theory of coalition portfolios would be largely unnecessary, since a theory for why an 
interest group joins a single coalition would be sufficient to account for its participation in multiple 
coalitions. 
 The second possible answer draws upon the recent work of Nelson and Yackee (2012). They 
argue that coalitions are influential because they increase the uniformity of the messages sent by 
interest groups to policymakers. According to Nelson and Yackee, coalitions are more influential 
when they are larger because they signal more clearly to policymakers that the position taken by the 
coalition is viable. Thus, we hypothesize that interest groups exert more influence over the policy 
process when they join coalitions that are larger than when they join coalitions that are smaller. If 
this hypothesis is true, then Nelson and Yackee’s (2012) arguments about coalition success apply at 
the interest-group level as well. According to this view, adding a coalition to its portfolio helps an 
interest group more if the coalition includes a large number of other groups than if it includes a 
small number of other groups. 
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 The third possible answer invokes social network theory to account for the value added of 
joining coalitions. When interest groups work together in a coalition, this relationship is a type of 
social network tie (Ansell, Reckhow, and Kelly 2009; Heaney 2004). At a minimum, coalitional co-
membership affords two groups common access to inside information about the coalition’s 
activities, strategies, and plans. Co-members of a coalition become linked in the minds of audiences 
that are attentive to the coalition’s activities. For example, if co-members of a coalition mutually sign 
a letter to legislators advocating a position on pending legislation, then the legislators reading the 
letter have reason to believe that the groups work together. Coalition co-membership may involve 
deeper relationships between interest groups – perhaps including intimate communication and 
collaboration – though the degree of closeness between groups varies from group to group and 
from coalition to coalition. 
 When an interest group joins a new coalition, it may change its position in the overall 
network of coalition relationships among groups. If the membership of the new coalition is not 
perfectly redundant with the membership of another coalition of which it is a member, then joining 
this coalition links the group in a distinct way to other interest groups, thus modifying its network 
position. An interest group’s network position also depends on the decisions of other groups. If A 
and B are both interest groups in a coalition network, then A’s position may change when B adds or 
drops membership in a coalition. For example, A may become relatively less central in the network 
when B joins coalition P; or, A may become relatively more central in the network when B 
withdraws from coalition Q.  Each interest group has a position in a coalition network that is defined by its 
coalition portfolio in conjunction with the portfolios of all other interest groups in the network at a given point in time. 
 The position of an interest group in a coalition network may be of value to that group for 
three reasons. First, the group’s position matters for its access to information within the network 
(Granovetter 1973, 1985; Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004). Second, the group’s position shapes 
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its opportunities for brokerage in the network (Burt 1992; Fernandez and Gould 1994; Freeman 1979; 
Heaney 2006). Third, the group’s position reflects its status in the network (Laumann and Knoke 
1987; Podolny 2005). 
Recognizing the importance of network position, we hypothesize that interest groups with 
greater betweenness in the coalition network exert greater influence over the policy process than do 
interest groups with lesser betweenness in the coalition network. A group’s betweenness depends on 
the degree to which it is positioned on the shortest paths between others in the network (Freeman 
1979; Wasserman and Faust 1994). If a group lies on the shortest path between other actors, then it 
is more likely to gain access to timely and sensitive information, be sought out as a broker in the 
network, and occupy high status. For these reasons, previous studies of interest group politics rely 
on betweenness to conceptualize variations in network position (Ansell, Reckhow, and Kelly 2009; 
Grossmann and Dominguez 2009; Heaney 2006). We anticipate that policymakers are more likely to 
rely on interest groups with high betweenness as contacts that minimize their transaction costs for 
managing the advocacy community than they are to rely on interest groups with low betweenness. 
Thus, we hypothesize that these high-betweenness groups are more likely than other groups to be 
able to exploit their network position to their own advantage in gaining influence over the policy 
process.1 If this hypothesis is true, then the ability of interest groups to leverage their coalition 
portfolios to achieve influence depends not only on the decisions that they make to join coalitions 
                                                            
1 Network position may be conceptualized in a large number of possible ways, each of which 
emphasizes a different aspect of network structure, such as prominence or connectedness.  For an 
extensive discussion, see Wasserman and Faust (1994).  In this article, we focus on betweenness 
because it best accounts for the aspects of network position that we think are especially important in 
interest group politics: access to information, potential for brokerage, and status. 
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or not, but also on the participation decisions of other groups in the network.  According to this 
view, the value of a group’s coalition portfolio is not exclusively within its control. 
Although we conduct a competitive test of our three hypotheses – which focus on number 
of coalitions, average coalition size, and network position, respectively – these hypotheses are not 
mutually exclusive of one another. It is possible that an interest group simultaneously gains influence 
by joining more coalitions, increasing the average size of its coalitions, and improving its network 
position. There is no deterministic relationship between these concepts. For example, as a group 
expands the number of coalitions that it is in, it may either increase or decrease the average size of 
its coalitions, and it may either improve or worsen its network position. The objective of our 
research is to determine which, if any, of these explanations account for how the composition of 
coalition portfolios enables interest groups to exert influence over the policy process. 
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 
 The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act was signed into law 
by President George W. Bush on December 8, 2003. It is generally referred to by its short title, the 
Medicare Modernization Act, or its abbreviation, MMA. The MMA is principally known as the 
legislation that established a prescription drug benefit in Medicare (also known as Medicare Part D), 
settling a more than decade-long dispute on the topic and fulfilling a significant domestic policy 
campaign promise by President Bush. At the same time, the MMA was major legislation that 
addressed broader issues in Medicare and health care generally. It created the Medicare Advantage 
program to replace Medicare + Choice as the way to deliver private health benefits to beneficiaries 
that choose this option (also known as Medicare Part C). It made a variety of incremental changes to 
the ways that hospital services and physician services are delivered and paid for by Medicare (Parts A 
and B), such as by altering the rules for covering preventive health services, competitive bidding for 
durable medical equipment, and the reimbursement of physician-administered drugs for multiple 
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sclerosis patients. Beyond Medicare, the law addressed the importation of prescription drugs and 
authorized the formation of tax-preferred health savings accounts. Overall, the MMA had broad 
consequences for the operation of Medicare and other federal health programs in the United States.2 
 President Bush and Republican leaders in Congress put their credibility on the line in 
promoting the law, while the Democratic Party was split in its opposition to the law. Democrats and 
Republicans divided over the role private insurance companies in the administration of Medicare, 
with Republicans pushing for a larger role and Democrats desiring a smaller role.  As a result, the 
MMA passed the House and Senate by narrow margins, with the procedural legitimacy of the final 
vote in the US House of Representatives in dispute (Iglehart 2004). 
The MMA remained contentious in the aftermath of its passage (Oberlander 2007).  This 
contentiousness manifested itself in disputes over the implementation of several major provisions, 
such as the regulation of Medicare Advantage, the rule for providing subsidies to low-income 
beneficiaries, and the evaluation of demonstration projects set in motion by the law. Some interest 
groups, such as associations representing health insurance companies, took the position that they 
had a great deal at stake in the success of the MMA and, thus, tried to promote its effective 
implementation. Other groups, such as liberal advocacy organizations, approached the 
implementation process as one more opportunity to revisit the policy debates lost during the law’s 
enactment. Nonetheless, the fundamental structure of the MMA remained essentially intact almost 
ten years after the law’s enactment. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (also known colloquially as 
“Obamacare”) somewhat altered the rules that govern Medicare Advantage and closed the so-called 
“donut hole” of prescription drug coverage under Part D.  Other aspects of the MMA have been 
incrementally modified since 2003, but the MMA has not been subject to the kind of unraveling that 
sometimes befalls landmark reforms (Patashnick 2008). 
                                                            
2 See US House of Representatives (2003) for details on the MMA’s provisions. 
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 The political process surrounding the MMA makes it an excellent case around which to 
evaluate the effects of coalition portfolios on interest group influence. By the time of the MMA 
debate in 2003, the consensus politics that surrounded Medicare during the early decades of its 
existence (Marmor 2000) had been replaced by competitive interest group politics (Oberlander 2003, 
2007). Hundreds of interest groups from across the political spectrum became involved (to varying 
degrees) in the political contest over the MMA. The issues surrounding the law were complex and 
multifaceted, involving a mix of distributive, redistributive, and regulatory concerns. To address 
these concerns, interest groups formed a plethora of coalitions on matters large and small. The 
topics engaged by the MMA spanned multiple government agencies including, but not limited to, 
the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Health and 
Human Services. The MMA remained high on policymakers’ for several years, allowing us to 
observe changes in the policy process from enactment to implementation of the law. In summary, 
examination of the MMA allows the observation of wide variation in types of interest groups, 
coalitions, and political configurations over the policy process. 
 The politics of health care are certainly not typical of the policies of other policy domains in 
the United States (Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury 1993). As Carpenter (2012) argues, health 
politics are more amenable to redistributive arguments and moral claims than are politics in other 
domains, and bureaucratic agencies are more engaged in the administration of health policies than 
they are in other policy areas. However, because health politics are broad and diverse enough to 
permit the observation of variation in the essential dimensions of our question, they provide an 
appropriate context for our investigation.   
Research Design 
 In order to study the relationship between interest group influence and coalition portfolios, 
it is essential to select a sample such that the interest groups in the sample share many coalition 
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memberships.  A random sample of interest groups would not accomplish this objective because 
randomly selected groups are unlikely to work on many issues in common. Moreover, much 
information about coalition participation is not advertised publicly, though it circulates throughout 
the policy community. As a result, it is necessary to obtain information about coalition participation 
through personal interviews, which are time- and resource-intensive to conduct. These two 
considerations call for a research design that focuses on a limited number of interest groups engaged 
within a coherent area of public policy.  Along these lines, Laumann and Knoke (1987) set the 
standard for selecting the most active interest groups within a policy domain. In this article, we 
follow Laumann and Knoke’s protocol to identify the most active interest groups that participated in 
the debate over the MMA from 2003 to 2006. This approach allows us to examine the dynamic 
participation of a diversity of interest groups and coalitions in a major public policy debate.  
Importantly, it permits the observation of how policy feedback from the passage of the MMA 
reconfigured coalition structures and, thus, altered the opportunities of interest groups to influence 
Medicare policy from enactment to implementation of the law. 
 To select a sample of the most active groups participating in the MMA debate, we relied on a 
variety of sources. Specifically, we examined: (1) interest groups that testified before Congress on 
Medicare-related issues between 2001 and 2005 (LexisNexis 2001-2005); (2) the 120 interest groups 
with the largest reported lobbying expenditures that lobbied Congress on Medicare or Medicaid 
between 2001 and 2005 (US Senate, Office of Public Records 2001-2005); (3) the 50 interest groups 
with the largest reported lobbying expenditures that lobbied the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services between 2001 and 2005 (US Senate, Office of Public Records  2001-2005); (4) interest 
groups that were mentioned in articles about Medicare appearing in Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report, Roll Call, The Hill, and The New York Times (between 2001 and 2005); and (5) interest groups 
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that announced a public position either for or against the MMA, according to the congressional 
leadership offices of the Democratic and Republican parties (obtained by personal interviews).   
Compiling multiple sources led to the identification of 378 interest groups that had at least 
some notable involvement in the debate over the MMA. We selected all interest groups with three 
or more mentions across all the sources we examined, which yielded a sample of 106 interest groups.  
We then selected an additional nine interest groups for inclusion in the study based on our 
subjective judgment that these were important players on the issue, yielding a total sample of 115 
interest groups.3 This list of organizations is provided in Online Appendix A. We contacted 
lobbyists representing all 115 organizations between May and August 2006 to request a personal 
interview. We were ultimately able to conduct interviews with 102 of these organizations, for an 
interview participation rate of approximately 89 percent.4 The interviews lasted between 30 minutes 
and 90 minutes, with a typical interview running approximately 45-60 minutes. 
                                                            
3 For example, we added the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) to the sample because it was involved in an effort to educate the African American 
population about the benefits entitled to them under Medicare Part D. Our formal count of 
mentions in multiple sources did not suggest that NAACP should be included in the study, yet we 
judged its work to be sufficiently important as to merit inclusion. In the section on robustness 
analysis below, we report that including a dummy variable for these cases in the regression model 
does not change the conclusions drawn from our empirical analysis. 
4 Nonparticipation in the study seems to have been due to lack of interest in the study or the 
inconvenience of participating in a personal interview. We were unable to detect any systematic 
selection biases caused by nonparticipation. For example, nonrespondents were not 
disproportionately from one ideological perspective, industry, or organizational type. 
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During the interest group interviews, we extracted four pieces of information that are 
relevant to the study at hand.5 First, we asked respondents to list the MMA-relevant coalitions that 
they participated in during the debate over MMA implementation from 2004 to 2006 and to provide 
either a list of participating members of the coalition or contact information for a source within the 
coalition that could provide that list. Second, we asked respondents to rate the partisan composition 
of their lobbying contacts on MMA-relevant issues on a five-point scale from almost entirely 
focused on Democratic contacts (=1) to almost entirely focused on Republican contacts (=5), with 
an even balance between the two extremes providing the midpoint for the scale (=3). Third, we 
asked respondents to examine the list of 115 interest groups to assess which ones “stand out as 
especially influential and consequential in formulating Medicare policy” during the enactment of the 
MMA and then during the implementation of the MMA, giving us one measure of influence during 
each period.6 Fourth, we asked respondents if any organizations that they think of as especially 
                                                            
5 The interviews also included other questions which are not directly relevant to this article.  
The complete interview schedule is available in Online Appendix B.   
6 We asked respondents both about the enactment period (2003) and the implementation 
period (2004-2006) during a single interview conducted in 2006. It would have been preferable to 
conduct two interviews for each respondent – one in 2003 and one in 2006 – so as to minimize 
problems with recalling key information.  However, at the time that the study was conceptualized 
and planned, it was already 2006, so it was impossible to go back in time to conduct interviews 
during the enactment period. Thus, the retrospective nature of these interviews is a limitation of the 
study.  However, we do not view it as a major limitation. When we conducted interviews in 2006, we 
found that all respondents had strong recollections of the events of 2003. The events in question 
had occurred approximately two-and-a-half years earlier, but they were so crucial to policy debates 
that, at that time, respondents still discussed them with great passion. 
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influential and consequential in shaping Medicare policy had been omitted from the list. The fact 
that no single organization was repeatedly named in response to this question substantially 
strengthens our confidence that the list of 115 groups we compiled consists of all (or virtually all) of 
the major interest groups active in the MMA debate. 
 The data collected from the personal interviews enable us to construct measures of coalition 
portfolios and interest group influence for each interest group in the study. Coalition portfolios were 
measured using a multi-step process. After the respondent provided a list of the implementation 
coalitions in which it participated, we obtained lists of the membership of all these coalitions named 
by respondents. Lists were obtained directly from the respondents, from a third-party contact 
affiliated with the coalition, from a coalition letter circulated by the coalition, or from a coalition 
web site. This approach allows us to estimate the coalition portfolios of organizations that decided 
not to participate in the personal interview, since these organizations were included on the coalition 
lists provided by other contacts. It also enables us to include the name of a coalition in an interest 
group’s portfolio even if the group’s respondent may have neglected to mention it during the 
coalition’s interview. To obtain the list of coalitions active during the enactment of the MMA, we 
relied on the list of coalitions provided by Heaney (2006, pp. 917-9), which followed selection 
procedures comparable to those in this study. On average, each group was a member of 1.84 
coalitions during enactment (ranging from 0 to 6) and 4.40 coalitions during implementation 
(ranging from 0 to 14).  In total, we identified 39 coalitions active during the enactment of the MMA 
and 73 coalitions active during the implementation of the MMA, which are listed in Online 
Appendix C.7  The best of our knowledge, this is the largest set of coalitions ever analyzed in a study 
of interest group politics. 
                                                            
7 We counted private firms, such as Amgen and Johnson & Johnson, as interest groups in 
our study, whereas Heaney (2006) did not. As a result, we counted trade associations that had these 
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The coalitions identified as active during the enactment and implementation of the MMA 
were widely open to participation by all interested actors. The general philosophy that governed 
these coalitions was that they were happy to have any other interest group sign on to the coalition as 
long as they endorsed the stated goals of the coalition (Hula 1999).  We did not find the coalitions to 
be secretive, exclusive, or highly selective with respect to their membership, as might be the case for 
more volatile issues, such as abortion. Coalitions usually formed around sub-issues of the MMA, 
such as health savings accounts or the importation of prescription drugs. 
A small degree of overlap is present in what constitutes an interest group and what 
constitutes a coalition in this study. For our purposes, an “interest group” is any nongovernment, 
organizational actor that was identified by the sources in our data-gathering process as engaged in 
the debate over the MMA. However, seven of these organizational actors are organized as coalitions 
that contain other interest groups in the sample.  These overlapping actors include several trade 
associations and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO).8         
 Interest group influence over public policy is notoriously difficult to measure (Smith 1995).  
One reason for this difficulty is that policies – especially major legislation like the MMA – have 
hundreds of components that require the resolution of innumerable issues raised by interested 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
private firms as members to be coalitions in our study, which is the one point of difference between 
our selection methodology and that of Heaney (2006). This difference gave us 39 coalitions during 
enactment, rather than the 32 reported by Heaney (2006).    
8 To avoid any problems caused by these overlapping seven organizations, we explain below 
in the section on robustness analysis that we conducted our data analysis both with and without a 
dummy variable for these seven organizations, yielding the result that the conclusions of the 
research are not sensitive to their inclusion in the regression analysis. 
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parties. Because of this complexity, it is difficult for any one observer to collect enough information 
to reliably judge who influences policy. Instead, knowledge about influence is distributed among the 
network of active players in the policy domain that collectively observe the exercise of influence 
within their particular niches. For this reason, we rely on the well-established method of asking 
interview respondents to rate the influence of other participants in the network (Fernandez and 
Gould 1994; Gamson 1966; Heaney 2006; Laumann and Knoke 1987; and Leifeld and Schneider 
2012). While any one respondent is likely have an incomplete view of the field, respondents 
collectively are expected to provide a reasonably accurate rating of the levels of group influence.   
 A skeptical reader may question whether the use of interviewer ratings introduces biases into 
the measurement of influence. For example, could the personal relationships among interview 
respondents bias their view of who is influential? While we certainly cannot argue that our measure 
of influence is perfect, we contend that it is reliable and valid as long as two conditions hold. First, 
the interview respondents are observers that are uniquely knowledgeable of the inner workings of 
the policy under examination. Second, the interview respondents consist of all (or almost all) of the 
major participants on each of the sub-issues in the policy area. If we had conducted a random 
sample of participants in the policy domain, then these conditions would not necessarily hold. 
However, by interviewing the leading lobbyists for almost all of the major interests involved in the 
MMA debate, we have generated an elite sample that meets these conditions and in which the biases 
in the data reflect the biases of the interest mobilization process (see Schattschneider 1960). To the 
extent that influence scores are, in part, a product of the reputations that interest groups gain from 
interacting directly with other interview respondents, we point out, in line with Gamson (1966), that 
these reputations are a resource to interest groups which and may have a direct effect on their ability 
to exert policy influence.       
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 A final reason to have confidence in our influence measure is that the empirical results 
appear to be a reasonable reflection of what other observers reported regarding the leading interest 
groups on this policy issue.  We find that the most influential groups during the enactment and 
implementation of the MMA were the AARP (formerly the American Association of Retired 
Persons), the pharmaceutical industry (as represented by the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America), and the health insurance industry (as represented by America’s Health 
Insurance Plans).  These results are in concordance with qualitative investigations reported by 
scholars such as Heaney (2006), Iglehart (2004), and Oberlander (2007).  
Empirical Models 
 We estimate two sets of regression models on interest group influence. In the first set of 
regressions, we estimate negative binomial panel models on the count of the number of times an 
interest group was cited by its peers as especially influential and consequential. Because these models 
explain the level of influence, they may not fully account for the fact that awareness about a group’s 
influence accumulates over time. For example, the American Medical Association and the AARP 
were involved in the debate over Medicare long before the introduction of the MMA (Laumann and 
Knoke 1987; Starr 1982). To address this potential problem, we estimate a second set of regression 
models on the change in the number of influence citations from enactment to implementation using 
ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. In these models, we estimate the effect of 
changes in our covariates of interest on changes in influence. This second set of regressions allows 
us to see how changes in coalition portfolios correspond with changes in influence. 
 To test our three hypotheses, we include variables in our models for the number of 
coalitions in an interest group’s portfolio, the average number of groups in a coalition in an interest 
group’s portfolio, and the network position occupied by a group based on its portfolio. Each of 
these measures is tabulated by arraying group and coalition memberships in a two-mode network (C) 
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arranged in an adjacency matrix, where actors in the first mode (rows) are interest groups (i) and 
actors in the second mode (columns) represent coalitions (j). A tie in C between i and j, denoted as cij 
=1, indicates that i is a member of j.  Otherwise, if i is not a member of j, then cij=0. 
We calculate three measures for each i in C: 
1) Number of Coalitions 
 
The number of coalitions (n) to which group i belongs is given as: 
𝑛𝑖 = �𝑐𝑖𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1
 
where the set of all possible coalitions has J elements. 
2) Average Coalition Size 
The average size (s) of a coalition to which group i belongs is given as: 
𝑠𝑖 = 1𝑛𝑖��𝑐𝑖,𝑗�𝑐𝑖,𝑗𝐼𝑖=1 �
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
where the set of all possible groups has I elements. 
3) Betweenness 
 
Betweenness is a descriptive statistic used in the analysis of actors in social networks, first 
popularized for one-mode networks by Freeman (1977) and elaborated for two-mode networks in 
Borgatti and Everett (1997). It relies on the concept of a geodesic path: a path between two actors in C, 
is a geodesic path (g) if it is the shortest path, requiring the fewest number of intermediaries, between 
those actors. An actor’s betweenness is the proportion of geodesics between each pair of actors in the 
network that pass through that actor. Calculation of betweenness for actor i in C begins by 
computing bi: 
𝑏𝑖 = 12� � 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑔𝑎𝑏𝐾𝑏≠𝑖,𝑎𝐾𝑎≠𝑖 , 
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where 𝐾 = 𝐼 + 𝐽, 𝑔𝑎𝑏 is the number of  gs from actor a to actor b, where a and b are any actors in C, 
and 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑏 is the number of gs from a to b that pass through i.  b i is then normalized by the maximum 
possible betweenness for any actor, given the actor’s mode (i or j) and the size thereof.  For all i in 
C, this normalization achieve first by computing: 
𝑏𝑖 𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 12 [𝐽2(𝑠 + 1)2 + 𝐽(𝑠 + 1)(2𝑡 − 𝑠 − 1) − 𝑡(2𝑠 − 𝑡 + 3)]  , 
where s is equal to the integer resulting from the division (𝐼−1)
𝐽
 and 𝑡 is the integer remainder 
resulting from the division  (𝐼−1)
𝐽
 for a given computation of s.  For C, the betweenness (b*) of group 
i is given by: 
𝑏𝑖
∗ = 𝑏𝑖
𝑏𝑖 𝑚𝑎𝑥  . 
 In each regression, we use a set of control variables that accounts for explanations for 
interest group influence besides the composition of a group’s coalition portfolio.  First, we include a 
variable for the Number of Registered Lobbyists working on Medicare that a group has in Washington, 
DC. We use this variable based on the expectation that when groups devote more effort to lobbying, 
they will have greater influence over policy, other things equal (Austen-Smith 1993; Bauer, Pool, and 
Dexter 1963; Birnbaum 1992; Johnson and Broder 1996).  
Second, we include a variable for the Political Party Lean of the interest group. Although 
interest groups often prefer to officially maintain a nonpartisan posture, their behavior usually 
suggests stronger connections with one party than with the other (Greenstone 1969; Kersh 2002; 
Koger and Victor 2009). We use this variable based on the expectation that interest groups benefit if 
they are linked to the party in control of Congress, other things equal. Since the Republican Party 
controlled both houses of Congress during the period of our study (2003-2006), we expect that 
group connections with Republicans are likely to translate into more policy influence. 
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Third, we include a variable for whether or not the group endorsed the MMA during the 
enactment debate (US House Committee on Ways and Means 2003). We use this variable because of 
statements by the Republican leadership, as part of the so-called K Street Project, that groups 
supporting the Republican Party agenda would be rewarded while those that did not would be 
frozen out of the policy process (Chaddock 2003; Confessore 2003). Thus, we expect that interest 
groups that endorsed the MMA would have greater influence over the policy process than those that 
did not, other things equal. 
Finally, we use a series of dummy variables for key health industries that had notably high 
stakes in the MMA debate: medical doctors, home care providers, hospitals, insurance companies, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, and pharmacies/pharmacists. These categories are mutually exclusive 
but not collectively exhaustive. Somewhat fewer than half (50) of the groups in the study fall into 
one of these categories, while 65 groups (such as citizens advocacy organizations) are not affiliated 
with any of these industries. We do not have specific expectations about which industries are likely 
to gain/loose influence, but conjecture that influence would vary on an industry-by-industry basis. 
We test each hypothesis independently and in conjunction with the other hypotheses in the 
study. By estimating a series of models, rather than a single model, we ensure that our results are not 
an artifact of multicollinearity among the focus variables.  Model (1) provides our base model 
without any coalition portfolio variables on the level of interest group influence. Model (2) tests the 
hypothesis for the number of coalitions, Model (3) tests the hypothesis for coalition size, and Model 
(4) tests the hypothesis for network position. Models (5), (6), and (7) test these hypotheses in 
conjunction with one another.  Models (8) through (14) repeat the specifications of the first set of 
models, but instead switch to Change in Interest Group Influence as the dependent variable, along with 
changes in the time-varying independent variables in the study. 
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Results 
 The results of estimating Models (1) through (7) are reported in Table 1.  Our first 
hypothesis, that an interest group’s influence increases with each coalition that it joins, is not 
supported in any model. Similarly, our second hypothesis, that an interest group’s influence expands 
along with the average size of coalitions that it joins, is not supported in any specification. However, 
our third hypothesis, that interest groups gain influence when their coalition portfolios afford them 
a position between other groups in the coalition network, is supported in all three models in which it 
is tested: Models (4), (6), and (7). This result implies that betweenness augments interest group 
influence when it appears in the regression in comparison with control variables and while holding 
constant the number and/or size of coalitions in a group’s portfolio. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 Several control variables in the model are significant predictors of levels of influence.  
Number of Registered Lobbyists and Endorser of the MMA are positive and significant, as expected, in all 
seven specifications of the regression. However, Political Party Lean is not a significant predictor of 
influence levels in any specification. Insurance companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and 
pharmacies/pharmacists register significantly higher than average levels of influence, other things 
equal. Our results are mixed for medical doctors, which enter Models (4), (5), (6), and (7) with 
significant negative coefficients, but fall slightly below the significance threshold in Models (1), (2), 
and (3). Home care and hospitals do not stand out as significantly different from average levels of 
influence in any model specification. 
 The results of estimating Models (8) through (14) confirm the conclusions drawn from the 
results of Models (1) through (7) with respect to the focal hypothesis of the paper. Our third 
hypothesis is supported in all instances, but our first and second hypotheses fail to receive any 
confirmation. Thus, changes in betweenness predict changes in influence, even after controlling for 
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changes in other aspects of the coalition portfolio. On the other hand, coefficients on several of the 
control variables differ from the first set of models. Change in Number of Lobbyists, Political Party Lean, 
and Endorser of the MMA do not significantly correspond with changes in influence reputation. 
Insurance companies and pharmacists/pharmacies gained influence as the policy process shifted 
from enactment to implementation. Pharmaceutical manufacturers were viewed as having lost 
influence as the process transitioned to implementation, although their absolute levels of influence 
remained high. Coefficients for the home care industry were unstable across models, although 
medical doctors and hospitals did not experience changes in influence that were significantly 
different from other interest groups.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 The robust conclusion resulting from these analyses is that interest groups increase their 
influence over Medicare policy when they construct coalition portfolios that situate them between 
other interest groups in the coalition network. The number of coalitions they join does not appear to 
matter. Neither does the size of their coalitions.9 Rather, interest groups tend to be influential when 
they are positioned strategically in the network of coalitions. A position of betweenness is desirable 
for gathering information, exercising brokerage, and displaying status. Thus, when interest groups 
are deciding to become involved in coalitions, they are well advised to consider the overall 
configuration of interests in the policy area in which they are working. If a coalition places them 
between interests that are otherwise difficult to connect, then they may be able to reap gains for 
their constituents by joining that coalition.  However, achieving such a position may well be beyond 
                                                            
9 This finding does not necessarily contradict the analysis of Nelson and Yackee (2012), 
which shows that coalitions that are larger tend to be more influential. It may be the case that larger 
coalitions get more of what they want (as Nelson and Yackee show), but that this success does not 
necessarily translate into direct benefits for individual groups (as we show). 
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an individual group’s reach, as betweenness is determined not only by a group’s choices, but also by 
the structure of the overall coalition network.   
Our findings regarding betweenness should not be interpreted prescriptively as implying that 
interest groups should not join coalitions that do not improve a group’s betweenness.  Many good 
reasons may exist to join these coalitions. For example, the interest group’s leaders may believe 
deeply in the cause promoted by the coalition. Or, the interest group’s lobbyist may owe a favor to 
the group that is leading the coalition. Nevertheless, our analysis demonstrates that the interest 
group is unlikely to improve its own influence by joining such a coalition, other things equal.  
Robustness Analysis 
 In addition to the fourteen specifications of our model presented in Tables 1 and 2, we 
estimated a wide range of alternative specifications of the model.  Our guiding principle was to make 
sure that the arbitrary specification decisions that we made in estimating Models (1) through (14) did 
not unduly influence the substantive conclusions drawn from the research (Leamer 1983).  Among 
these specifications, we re-estimated each model with and without dummy variables for the nine 
groups included as part of the judgment sample and, alternatively, the seven interest groups that 
overlapped between the interest group and coalition samples.  In each case, the conclusions 
pertaining to our focal hypotheses were not sensitive to the inclusion of these observations. 
 A more involved question of robustness pertains to whether the network effect that we 
attribute to position in the coalition network is uniquely attributable to coalition participation, or if it 
is instead the result of some other kind of network participation that is highly correlated with the 
coalition network. For example, numerous scholars point to the importance of communication 
networks in understanding the strategic behavior of interest groups (see, for example, Carpenter, 
Esterling, and Lazer 2004). Could communication networks that underlie coalition networks be the 
true cause of the influence patterns that we observe? 
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 First, from a theoretical perspective, we think that it is unlikely that coalition networks are 
simply derivative of communication networks. Communications often occur behind the scenes of 
politics among people that would never work together in coalitions. For example, lobbyists may 
have friendships from past positions that connect them informally with those who their 
organizations are formally aligned against. Alternatively, organizations may form coalitions with 
some interest groups with which they have little informal contact. In short, we have reason to 
believe that communications and coalitions are quite different things. 
 Second, we are able to test our expectations about communications and coalitions by 
drawing upon additional interview data on behind-the-scenes communications. Specifically, we 
asked respondents to “place a check mark after the name of all organizations on this list with which 
your organization discusses Medicare policy matters. Indicate whether these discussions occur 
occasionally or frequently, and whether they occurred during enactment or during implementation.” 
From these responses, we are able to estimate betweenness in the communications network either 
on the basis of occasional or frequent communication. 
 Using the data from our communication networks question, we re-estimate each model with 
an additional variable for occasional communication and, alternatively, an additional variable for 
frequent communication. We report the results of the re-estimated models with the frequent 
communication independent variable in Online Appendix D. The results do not differ significantly 
when the models are estimated using occasional communication. While the pattern of coefficients 
on the control variables does differ slightly from our results in Tables 1 and 2, the differences do not 
affect our finding about the influence advantages of betweenness in the coalition network.   
Portfolio Dynamics from Enactment to Implementation 
 The results of our regression analysis demonstrate convincingly that the composition of an 
interest group’s coalition portfolio – particularly the extent to which it situates the group between 
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other groups in the coalition network – makes a difference for the group’s policy influence. 
However, neither the composition of its coalition portfolio, nor its position vis-à-vis other groups, is 
entirely within the control of the group itself. These factors depend, in part, on the overall 
configuration of the coalition network, which changes over the course of the policy process. 
 We observed the coalition politics of Medicare policy during periods when the political 
system was debating and, subsequently, implementing a major policy reform. The ways in which 
interest groups used coalitions changed over this process. During the enactment period, interest 
group community was divided, in part, over the question of whether or not the MMA should 
become law. Coalitions formed both to promote and to oppose the chief contours of the proposed 
reform. Other coalitions emerged to attempt to advance or try to block specific provisions, such as 
the introduction of a Medicare co-payment by beneficiaries for clinical laboratory services.   
During the implementation period, the basic nature of the advocacy game changed. 
Coalitions no longer revolved around efforts to support or oppose the MMA as a whole. Rather, 
coalitions formed around the need to educate the public about the provisions of the MMA so as to 
smooth its implementation. The Medicare Today Coalition, which was formed during 
implementation and was joined by 33 of the interest groups in our study, was the archetypical 
example of this type of coalition. Original supporters and opponents of the MMA both had an 
incentive to participate in this type of coalition. Supporters had put their credibility on the line in 
pushing for the MMA, so they wanted it to succeed. Given the bill’s passage, many opponents, too, 
wanted to ensure that the MMA served critical populations, such as low-income and home-bound 
beneficiaries, as effectively as possible. Of course, interest groups still formed coalitions during the 
implementation phase that focused on attempting to add, delete, or modify targeted aspects of the 
legislation. However, the divisive politics of the enactment period was largely replaced by a more 
cooperative implementation phase of policymaking. 
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 In order to better understand the changing configuration of coalitions, we visualize the 
coalition networks in Figures 1 and 2. In these figures, black squares represent coalitions, white 
circles represent interest groups, and lines represent the membership of an interest group in a 
coalition. The size of white circles is scaled in proportion to the number of influence citations that 
the interest group received in that period. However, the size of the black squares is intentionally held 
constant. The diagram is drawn using an algorithm that places interest groups closer to one another 
in the network if they tend to be members of the same coalitions and more distant from one other if 
they tend to be members of different coalitions (Kamada and Kawai 1989). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 The divisiveness of enactment politics is immediately apparent in Figure 1. The lower right-
hand side of the graph, which is somewhat separated from the rest of the network, is dominated by 
opponents of the MMA. The lower left-hand side of the graph is dominated by supporters of the 
MMA. The top of the graph largely consists of interest groups that were focused on provisions that 
were peripheral to the larger MMA debate, such as reimbursements to hospitals and physicians. 
 The greater consensus of implementation politics is immediately apparent in Figure 2.  
Rather than organizing along factional lines, the network exhibits a core-periphery structure, which 
means that groups are clustered around a single center, rather than multiple centers. The 
implementation network is denser than the enactment network due to the expansion in the number 
of coalitions from 39 to 73. The evolving structure of the network affected which groups occupied 
positions of high betweenness in the network. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 To illustrate the consequences of moving from enactment to implementation, we label six 
groups in the network. We identify two groups that increased betweenness (AARP, American 
Pharmacists Association), two groups that maintained roughly constant betweenness (Generic 
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Pharmaceutical Association, American Society of Clinical Oncology), and two groups that lost 
betweenness (Families USA, American Hospital Association). These changes were both a product of 
strategic decisions at the group level and macro-level changes in the configuration of the network. 
 AARP gained betweenness in moving from enactment to implementation as a result of its 
strategic decision to increase its engagement with other groups. AARP had held back from 
participating in coalitions during enactment in order to engage in high-powered, private negotiations 
with Republican leaders in Congress (Iglehart 2004). During implementation, AARP elected to 
participate in coalitions designed to smooth the implementation of the MMA, given its controversial 
decision to endorse the legislation during the enactment debate (Heaney 2007). In contrast, the 
American Pharmacists Association (APhA) gained betweenness because the debate over 
implementation focused on issues where pharmacists possessed vital expertise, namely, how to 
manage formularies for the millions of recipients who would start to receive the prescription drug 
benefit. As the Medicare community addressed implementation, it needed pharmacists to be 
involved in the conversation. This reconfiguration of coalitions served APhA’s interests well. 
 Families USA is a citizens advocacy organization that helped to lead the charge against the 
MMA during enactment by arguing that the legislation put corporate profits above the needs of 
Medicare beneficiaries. By coordinating the opposition, Families USA was well positioned as a 
broker between smaller interest groups opposing the law and the broader Medicare policy 
community. After the law passed, its strategy no longer afforded itself an advantageous position vis-
à-vis the coalition network, which realigned to emphasize how to make the law work in practice. 
Likewise, the American Hospital Association (AHA) was an important broker during the enactment 
of the law when it helped to coordinate groups interested in improving Medicare reimbursement to 
hospitals. However, AHA and the wider hospital community mostly got what they wanted in the 
text of the MMA. Since these issues of reimbursement did not involve the kind of administrative 
29 
 
difficulties encountered by the prescription drug benefit and some other provisions, AHA was in a 
position to disengage from the Medicare coalitions during implementation. 
 Our analysis does not presume that interest groups know precisely where they are within the 
structure of the coalition network. Lobbyists need not be able to calculate their network 
betweenness in order to take advantage of the benefits that it provides. Some actors may understand 
that they have found themselves to be “well positioned” or “poorly positioned,” but benefits from 
brokerage, access to information, and increased status—or the costs of their absence—are accrued 
by interest groups regardless of the degree of awareness that they have about the network structure.  
The groups that are most likely to be able to take advantage of their position in the network are 
those that gradually adjust their positions and accommodate the interests of others, which is 
sometimes referred to as “robust action” (Padgett and Ansell 1993).     
 The reconfiguration of coalitions brought about by the enactment of the MMA is unlikely to 
be typical of how coalitions realign after the passage of major legislation. The MMA had numerous 
idiosyncrasies that molded the exact nature of policy feedback. Thus, the precise lesson of this case 
study ought not to be that coalitions switch from a factional structure during enactment to a core-
periphery structure during implementation. This outcome is almost certainly case specific. We 
believe that a more general lesson to draw is that feedback from legislative enactments does 
restructure coalition politics, which has implications for the way that interest groups build, use, and 
employ coalition portfolios. Future research must be attentive to these types of dynamics if it is to 
appreciate the strategies and consequences of interest group coalition politics. 
Conclusion 
 Interest group scholars have long recognized the ubiquity of coalitions to interest group 
advocacy. At their core, coalitions are strategic interactions among multiple groups. However, the 
extant literature on coalitions models this interaction only to a limited extent, providing little insight 
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on the common situation in which groups balance their commitments across a set of coalitions. In 
advancing a theory of coalition portfolios, we establish a framework for understand how group 
participation in multiple coalitions matters for the influence wielded by individual groups. Our 
theory models this influence both as a product of the strategies of individual groups and feedback 
generated by the dynamics of the policy process. More generally, our analysis deepens the extent to 
which interest group politics are understood as taking place within the structures generated by 
political networks. If advocacy is undertaken by groups acting as a part of a larger community – 
rather than as isolated, individual actors – then the study of interest group politics requires theories 
and methods that explicitly take these communities into account. 
 Our analysis concludes that the composition of coalition portfolios matters in allowing 
interest groups to influence policy. Specifically, we find that interest groups are more influential 
when they are situated between other groups in the coalition network, not simply when they 
accumulate memberships in many coalitions or join large coalitions. This finding is supported both 
when examining levels of interest group influence and when considering how influence changes over 
the policy process. However, this finding does not imply that interest groups can easily modify their 
coalition portfolios to amplify their influence. Instead, their success depends also on the coalitional 
choices made by other groups, as they react to feedback from the policy process. 
 Our investigation of interest group coalitions surrounding the Medicare Modernization Act 
of 2003 allows us to observe a wide diversity of interest groups and coalitions over significant 
changes in the policy process. While Medicare represents an important area of public policy, our 
analysis nonetheless examines only one policy area. Future research would benefit from testing these 
hypotheses in a diversity of policy areas so as to more thoroughly evaluate the generality of our 
findings.  
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Table 1.  Regression Models of Interest Group Influence 
Negative Binomial Estimator with Panel Data 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
Percent 
Imputed 
Number of Coalitions - -0.002 
(0.007) 
- - 0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
3.122 
(2.971) 
0.000 
Average Coalition Size - - -0.006 
(0.003) 
- (-0.009) 
(0.005) 
- -0.007 
(0.005) 
8.187 
(6.542) 
0.000 
Coalition Network Betweenness - - - 6.165** 
(1.791) 
- 6.888*** 
(1.876) 
5.527** 
(1.889) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
0.000 
Number of Registered Lobbyists 
   (Average per Six-Month Period) 
0.021** 
(0.007) 
0.020** 
(0.007) 
0.019** 
(0.007) 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
0.022** 
(0.007) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
3.525 
(4.116) 
19.565 
Political Party Lean 
   (5-point scale, 1=Democratic, 5=Republican)  
0.102 
(0.073) 
0.099 
(0.073) 
0.098 
(0.073) 
0.127 
(0.071) 
0.108 
(0.073) 
0.117 
(0.072) 
0.123 
(0.072) 
3.399 
(0.895) 
11.304 
Endorser of Medicare Modernization Act  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
0.366* 
(0.155) 
0.373* 
(0.157) 
0.395* 
(0.157) 
0.319* 
(0.150) 
0.380* 
(0.157) 
0.343* 
(0.153) 
0.350* 
(0.152) 
0.461 
(0.500) 
0.000 
Represents Medical Doctors  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
-0.512 
(0.266) 
-0.504 
(0.267) 
-0.502 
(0.267) 
-0.562* 
(0.258) 
-0.528* 
(0.266) 
-0.537* 
(0.261) 
-0.553* 
(0.261) 
0.078 
(0.269) 
0.000 
Represents Home Care Industry  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
-0.727 
(0.384) 
-0.727 
(0.385) 
-0.707 
(0.386) 
-0.701 
(0.373) 
-0.694 
(0.383) 
-0.700 
(0.375) 
-0.677 
(0.375) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
0.000 
Represents Hospitals  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
-0.047 
(0.381) 
-0.035 
(0.383) 
-0.019 
(0.383) 
-0.164 
(0.370) 
-0.053 
(0.381) 
-0.131 
(0.373) 
-0.139 
(0.373) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
0.000 
Represents Insurance Companies  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
0.797** 
(0.265) 
0.802** 
(0.266) 
0.811** 
(0.266) 
0.784** 
(0.257) 
0.797** 
(0.264) 
0.802** 
(0.259) 
0.800** 
(0.258) 
0.078 
(0.269) 
0.000 
Represents Pharmaceutical Manufacturers  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
0.876*** 
(0.235) 
0.886*** 
(0.237) 
0.925*** 
(0.238) 
0.838*** 
(0.227) 
0.913*** 
(0.236) 
0.873*** 
(0.231) 
0.894*** 
(0.231) 
0.096 
(0.295) 
0.000 
Represents Pharmacists or Pharmacies  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
0.608** 
(0.220) 
0.613** 
(0.221) 
0.646** 
(0.222) 
0.597** 
(0.213) 
0.645** 
(0.220) 
0.618** 
(0.215) 
0.642** 
(0.215) 
0.113 
(0.317) 
0.000 
Constant 12.900 
(645.522) 
14.637 
(521.661) 
16.714 
(566.135) 
16.189 
(590.015) 
15.061 
(341.888) 
16.156 
(436.521) 
16.577 
(477.955) 
- - 
 
Table 1 is continued on next page 
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Table 1.  Continued from previous page 
R 300,924 614,818 4,740,553 3,629,185 963,519 3,297,278 5,057,217 - - 
 (1.94x108) (3.21x108) (2.68x109) (2.14x109) (3.29x108) (1.44 x109) (2.42x109) - - 
S 2.100 2.086 2.073 2.239 2.111 2.206 2.215 - - 
 (0.290) (0.289) (0.285) (0.313) (0.293) (0.308) (0.310) - - 
Log Likelihood -748.616 -748.561 -747.258 -742.681 -746.765 -741.772 -740.756 - - 
Likelihood Ratio 𝜒2 63.93*** 63.69*** 65.92*** 78.89*** 67.79*** 79.72*** 81.92*** - - 
Likelihood Ratio Degrees of Freedom 9 10 10 10 11 11 12   
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.010, * p ≤ 0.050; Number of Groups = 115; Number of Periods = 2; Dependent variable mean = 18.296, std. dev. = 16.677. 
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Table 2.  Regression Models of Change in Interest Group Influence 
Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors 
Independent Variable (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
Percent 
Imputed 
Change in Number of Coalitions 
- 
-0.036 
(0.242) - - 
-0.049 
(0.245) 
-0.311 
(0.221) 
-0.312 
(0.225) 
2.557 
(2.570) 0.00 
Change in Average Coalition Size 
- - 
0.019 
(0.047) - 
0.022 
(0.047) - 
0.003 
(0.043) 
5.647 
(7.214) 0.00 
Change in Coalition Network Betweenness 
- - - 
99.803** 
(28.544) - 
120.508*** 
(18.548) 
120.394*** 
(18.979) 
0.001 
(0.014) 0.00 
Change in Number of Lobbyists 
   (Average Number per Six-Month Period) 
-0.139 
(0.071) 
-0.143 
(0.077) 
-0.146* 
(0.072) 
-0.042 
(0.096) 
-0.154 
(0.079) 
-0.062 
(0.100) 
-0.064 
(0.104) 
0.460 
(2.284) 20.00 
Political Party Lean 
   (5-point scale, 1=Democratic, 5=Republican)  
-0.812 
(0.510) 
-0.817 
(0.514) 
-0.814 
(0.509) 
-1.010* 
(0.442) 
-0.823 
(0.514) 
-1.095* 
(0.447) 
-1.095* 
(0.449) 
3.398 
(0.909) 11.30 
Endorser of Medicare Modernization Act  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
-0.987 
(0.874) 
-0.951 
(0.833) 
-1.055 
(0.883) 
-0.858 
(0.858) 
-1.018 
(0.856) 
-0.514 
(0.797) 
-0.522 
(0.819) 
0.461 
(0.501) 0.00 
Represents Medical Doctors  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
1.923 
(1.211) 
1.977 
(1.347) 
2.007 
(1.238) 
1.615 
(1.256) 
2.097 
(1.395) 
2.023 
(1.291) 
2.037 
(1.345) 
0.078 
(0.270) 0.00 
Represents Home Care Industry  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
2.915* 
(1.315) 
2.934* 
(1.340) 
2.839* 
(1.370) 
2.662 
(1.460) 
2.851* 
(1.385) 
2.778 
(1.421) 
2.768 
(1.425) 
0.035 
(0.184) 0.00 
Represents Hospitals  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
0.840 
(1.144) 
0.862 
(1.184) 
0.916 
(1.177) 
2.247 
(1.842) 
0.960 
(1.232) 
2.734 
(1.889) 
2.744 
(1.910) 
0.035 
(0.184) 0.00 
Represents Insurance Companies  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
4.822*** 
(1.263) 
4.919** 
(1.615) 
4.815*** 
(1.268) 
4.844*** 
(1.161) 
4.947** 
(1.620) 
5.694*** 
(1.457) 
5.696*** 
(1.468) 
0.078 
(0.270) 0.00 
Represents Pharmaceutical Manufacturers  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
-3.276** 
(0.918) 
-3.191* 
(1.228) 
-3.362** 
(0.960) 
-3.404** 
(0.978) 
-3.626** 
(1.230) 
-2.694* 
(1.198) 
-2.703* 
(1.201) 0.096 0.00 
Represents Pharmacists or Pharmacies  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
5.292*** 
(0.900) 
5.374*** 
(1.172) 
5.146*** 
(0.981) 
5.161*** 
(0.823) 
5.231*** 
(1.193) 
5.848*** 
(1.068) 
5.831*** 
(1.079) 
(0.113) 
(0.318) 0.00 
Constant -0.169 
(1.599) 
-0.106 
(1.652) 
-0.214 
(1.623) 
0.327 
(1.280) 
-0.136 
(1.664) 
0.979 
(1.342) 
0.974 
(1.359) - - 
F-test statistic 13.73*** 12.52*** 12.55*** 16.24*** 11.70*** 20.16*** 18.40*** - - 
F degrees of freedom (9,105) (10,104) (10,104) (10,104) (11, 103) (11, 103) (12, 102)   
R2 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.400 0.317 0.420 0.420 - - 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.010, * p ≤ 0.050; Number of Groups = 115; Number of Periods = 1; Dependent variable mean = -2.504, std. dev=4.504. 
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Figure 1.  Enactment Coalition Network, 2003 
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Figure 2.  Implementation Coalition Network 
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Online Appendix A.  Organizations Included in Sample of Interest Groups 
 
AARP (formerly known as the American Association of Retired Persons) 
Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy 
Advanced Medical Technology Association 
Aetna 
AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations) 
Alliance for Retired Americans 
Alliance of Specialty Medicine 
Alliance to Improve Medicare 
Alzheimer's Association 
American Academy of Actuaries 
American Academy of Family Physicians 
American Association for Homecare 
American Association of Homes & Services for the Aging 
American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons 
American Cancer Society 
American Clinical Laboratory Association 
American College of Emergency Physicians 
American College of Physicians 
American College of Surgeons 
American Enterprise Institute 
American Fed. of State, County,& Municipal Employees 
American Health Care Association 
American Health Quality Association 
American Heart Association 
American Hospital Association 
American Medical Association 
American Medical Directors Association 
American Nurses Association 
American Pharmacists Association 
American Physical Therapy Association 
American Psychiatric Association 
American Society of Clinical Oncology 
American Society of Consultant Pharmacists 
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists  
America's Health Insurance Plans 
Amgen 
Association of American Medical Colleges 
Biotechnology Industry Organization 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Brookings Institution 
Business Roundtable 
Caremark Rx 
Caterpillar 
Catholic Health Association of the United States 
Cato Institute 
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Center for Health Transformation 
Center for Medicare Advocacy 
Center for Studying Health Systems Change 
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities 
Cigna 
Concord Coalition 
Consumers Union 
CVS  
Disease Management Association of America 
Easter Seals 
Eli Lilly 
Employee Benefits Research Institute 
Employers Coalition on Medicare 
Express Scripts 
Families USA 
Federated Ambulatory Surgery Association 
Federation of American Hospitals 
General Motors Corporation 
Generic Pharmaceutical Association 
Geographic Equity in Medicare Coalition 
GlaxoSmithKline 
Guidant 
Healthcare Leadership Council 
Heritage Foundation 
HSA Coalition / Archer MSA Coalition 
Humana 
Johnson & Johnson 
Kaiser Family Foundation 
Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance 
Medco 
Medical Group Management Association 
Medicare Rights Center 
Medtronic 
Merck 
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill 
National Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People 
National Assn. of Public Hospitals and Health Systems 
National Association for Home Care & Hospice 
National Association of Chain Drug Stores 
National Association of Community Health Centers 
National Association of Health Underwriters 
National Association of Manufacturers 
National Association of Retired Federal Employees 
National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship 
National Comm. to Preserve Social Security & Medicare 
National Community Pharmacists Association 
National Council on the Aging 
National Education Association 
3 
 
National Federation of Independent Business  
National Governors Association 
National Multiple Sclerosis Society 
National Rural Health Association 
Novartis 
Pacificare 
Pfizer 
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
Progressive Policy Institute 
Project HOPE 
Public Citizen 
Seniors Coalition 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
United Auto Workers 
United Health Group 
Urban Institute 
Visiting Nurse Associations of America 
Wal-Mart 
(Washington) National Business Group on Health 
WellPoint 
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Online Appendix B.  Complete Interview Protocol 
Preliminary.  Interviewer records organization name, respondent name, respondent title, 
date/time/location, and phone/e-mail. 
Part A.  I would like to begin by asking a few open-ended questions about the politics and policies 
of Medicare over the past few years. 
1. From the perspective of your organization, what are the major weaknesses of the 
Medicare Modernization Act?  In what ways has its implementation been ineffective? 
2. From the perspective of your organization, what are the major strengths of the Medicare 
Modernization Act?  In what ways has its implementation been effective? 
3. How have the major issues of interest to your organization changed in moving from 
enactment to implementation?  Are you working on the same types of problems, or has 
your policy focus been transformed? 
4. What are the major government agencies (such as CMS or the FDA) that you have 
interacted with during the implementation process?  How have your interactions with 
these agencies changed since enactment? 
5. When interacting with members of Congress and their staffs, do you focus your 
attention (a) almost entirely on Republican members, (b) mostly on Republican 
members, but sometimes on Democratic members, (c) about evenly on Democrats and 
Republicans, (d) mostly on Democratic members, but sometimes on Republican 
members, or (e) almost entirely on Democratic members? 
6. Do you find that your relationships with the parties have changed over the 
implementation of the Medicare Modernization Act?  That is, have you grown closer to 
one party and more distant from the other, or have your relationships remained about 
the same? 
7. What are the principal ways that you relate to party representatives?  For example, is 
working with the majority and minority leaders offices the way to relate to the parties or, 
for example, do you relate more directly with the RNC or the DNC? 
8. Have you joined any coalitions to influence the implementation of the MMA?  If so, 
please name them and describe their work briefly.  Have these coalitions been effective?  
Why or why not?  Has the importance of these coalitions increased or diminished since 
the passage of the MMA? 
9. Have you attempted to use grassroots constituents to influence the implementation of 
the MMA?  If so, please describe the nature of you effort?  Would you say that these 
efforts are central to your lobbying effort or peripheral to your larger strategy? 
10. Does your organization use electoral and campaign strategies to bolster its position on 
Medicare issues?  If so, please describe the nature of the strategies. 
11. Does your organization provide funding or resources to other organizations in order to 
promote your position on Medicare issues?  If so, please describe the nature of these 
efforts. 
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Part B.  In the second part of this interview, I would like to ask you about the organizations that 
you work with on issues relevant to the Medicare Modernization Act, and the issues were you have 
focused your priorities. 
1. Please look at the following list of organizations active in the Medicare policy network.  
Please place a check mark after the name of all organizations on this list with which your 
organization discusses Medicare policy matters. Indicate whether these discussions occur 
occasionally or frequently, and whether they occurred during enactment or during 
implementation, by checking the corresponding columns. 
2. All of the organizations on this list are very active in the Medicare policy area. But I 
would now like you to indicate which of these organizations stand out as especially 
influential and consequential in formulating Medicare policy.  Please indicate whether 
you believe that this influence was exerted during enactment, implementation, or both, 
by checking the corresponding columns. 
3. As you know, the ability of some organizations to influence public policy changes 
considerably as the policy process shifts from enactment to implementation.  Are there 
organizations on this list that have significantly increased there influence, or seen the 
influence decrease, since implementation of the MMA began?  Please place a “plus” or a 
“minus” sign next to the name of the organization to indicate this change? 
4. Are there any organizations that are especially influential and consequential in 
formulating Medicare policy, in your opinion, who have been omitted from this list?  
Please write them at the bottom of the form and indicate your discussion patterns and 
influence assessment. 
5. Now I am would like to ask about the Medicare issues your organization has focused on.  
Please look at the following list of issues and tell me if these issues have been major or 
minor concerns for your organization during the enactment and implementation of the 
MMA.  Please check the corresponding columns. 
6. Are there any questions that I have not asked you that you think that I should ask you 
about the politics of the MMA? 
Thank you very much for your time and participation.  
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Online Appendix C.  Coalitions Included in Sample 
Enactment Period, 2003 
Advanced Medical Technology Association 
Alliance of Specialty Medicine 
Alliance to Improve Medicare 
American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations 
America's Health Insurance Plans 
Anti-Reimportation Coalition 
Archer MSA Coalition 
Biotechnology Industry Organization 
Business Roundtable 
Campaign to Preserve – Not Privatize – Medicare 
Cancer Leadership Council 
Clinical Laboratory Coalition 
Coalition for a Competitive Pharmaceutical Market 
Coalition for Access to Medical Services, Equipment, and Technology 
Coalition for Fair Payments to Health Care Providers Treating Emergency Undocumented 
Immigrants 
Coalition to Protect America's Health Care 
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities 
Employers’ Coalition on Medicare 
Geographic Equity in Medicare Coalition 
Independence Through Enhancement of Medicare and Medicaid 
Indirect Medical Education Coalition 
Leadership Council of Aging Organizations 
Low-Income Provisions Coalition 
Mental Health Liaison Group 
Multiple Sclerosis Prescription Drug Coalition 
Niche Hospital Coalition 
Opponents of a Home Health Co-payment 
Partnership for Safe Medicines 
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
Pharmacist Provider Coalition 
Pharmacy Benefits All Coalition 
Public Hospital Pharmacy Coalition 
Rural Hospital Coalition 
Rx Benefits Coalition 
Rx Health Value 
Safety Net Hospitals Coalition 
Therapy Cap Coalition 
Update Coalition 
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Implementation Period, 2004-2006 
304b Coalition 
Access to Benefits Coalition 
Access to Medical Imaging Coalition 
Ad Hoc Coalition on Parkinson's 
Advanced Medical Technology Association 
African American Enrollment Coalition 
Alliance for Better Health Care 
Alliance of Specialty Medicine 
Alliance to Improve Medicare 
AMA Update Coalition 
AMA Working Group on Access 
Ambulatory Care Quality Alliance 
Ambulatory Surgery Center Coalition 
American Federation of Labor - Council of Industrial Organizations 
Americans United for Change 
America's Health Insurance Plans 
Assisted Living Coalition 
Biotechnology Industry Organization 
Business Roundtable 
Campaign for America's Future 
Campaign for Quality Care 
Campaign to Protect-Not Privatize-Medicare 
Cancer Leadership Council 
Clinical Laboratory Coalition 
CMS Payment Rate Coalition 
Coalition for a Competitive Pharmaceutical Market 
Coalition for Affordable Health Coverage 
Coalition for Community Pharmacy Action 
Coalition for Patient Centered Imaging 
Coalition on Human Needs 
Coalition to Ensure Beneficiary Access 
Coalition to Preserve Patient Access to Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Services 
Coalition to Protect America's Health Care 
Coalition to Protect Choice for Seniors 
Consensus Group on Medicare Therapy Management 
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities 
Corporate Health Care Coalition 
Employers' Coalition on Medicine 
Fund to Assure an Independent Retirement 
Geographic Equality in Medicare Coalition 
Health Policy Consensus Group 
Healthcare Administrative Simplification Coalition 
Healthcare Leadership Council 
Hospital Quality Alliance 
HSA Coalition 
Informal Coalition for People on the Ground Receiving the Prescription Drug Benefit 
8 
 
Informal Coalition on Home Health Care 
Leadership Council of Aging Organizations 
Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance 
Low Income Beneficiaries Coalition 
Managed Care Choice Coalition 
Medicare Access for Patients Rx 
Medicare Consumers Working Group 
Medicare Rx Education Network 
Medicare Savings Coalition 
Medicare Today 
Mental Health Coalition 
Multiple Sclerosis Prescription Drug Coalition 
My Medicare Matters 
National Coalition on Quality Assessment 
National Council for Prescription Drug Programs 
National Health Council 
National Quality Forum 
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
Pharmacist Provider Coalition 
Pharmacy Quality Alliance 
Physician Consortium for Patient Care Improvement 
Preventive Health Partnership 
Rural Provider Coalition 
Rx Benefits Coalition 
Rx Health Value 
Section 1011 Coalition on Payments for Undocumented Immigrants 
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Online Appendix D.  Robustness Analysis 
 As we explain in the robustness analysis section of the printed article, we add a variable for 
betweenness in the communication network to each model from (1) to (14). This exercise yields 
models which are otherwise analogous to the original models.1 We report the estimates of these 
models in Tables D1 and D2, below. We report results based on frequent communication. However, 
estimates obtained based on occasional communication yield substantively identical results.   
 Examining the results reported in Table D1 (below) yields a very similar pattern to the one 
reported in Table 1. Betweenness in the communication network has a positive, statistically 
significant effect in each model in the table. This result implies that that when interest groups are 
better connected in the communication network they are more successful in achieving influence 
over Medicare than interest groups that are less well connected. Nonetheless, the positive, 
statistically significant coefficients on betweenness in the coalition network models (4), (6), and (7) 
are not affected. This result implies that our conclusion about the positive effect of coalition 
network position (hypothesis three) is supported in the new models. 
 Models (5) and (6) yield significant, negative coefficients on average coalition size (in Model 
5) and number of coalitions (in Model 6). These “perverse” signs are the opposite of what we 
predicted in hypotheses one and two. Given the increasing problem with multicollinearlity in a larger 
model, too much weight should not be given to these perverse findings. We could interpret the 
findings in one of two ways. On the one hand, we could view them as an even stronger rejection of 
hypotheses one and two, which predicted positive coefficients. On the other hand, we could view 
them as evidence that increasing average coalition size or the number of coalitions without 
                                                            
1 In Model (6) we dropped the variable on number of registered lobbyists due to 
convergence problems.   
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increasing communication betweenness leads to a reduction of influence. Either interpretation is 
consistent with our core finding on the importance of network position in the coalition network. 
 The results reported in Table D2, which includes estimates of models of change in interest 
group influence, are parallel to the results in Table D1 in terms of direction and significance of 
coefficients on focal variables. Changes in betweenness in the communication network are positive 
and significant in each of models (8) through (14), verifying the importance of position in 
communication networks to interest group influence. However, the inclusion of a measure of the 
communication network does not alter the conclusion about the importance of position in the 
coalition network, which is our central finding. In contrast to what we report in Table D2, we do 
not observe coefficients with perverse signs in these equations.      
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Table D1.  Regression Model of Interest Group Influence with Communication Network 
Negative Binomial Estimator with Panel Data 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
Percent 
Imputed 
Number of Coalitions - -0.001 
(0.007) 
- - 0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.017* 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
3.122 
(2.971) 
0.000 
Average Coalition Size - - -0.006 
(0.003) 
- -0.010* 
(0.005) 
- -0.008 
(0.005) 
8.187 
(6.542) 
0.000 
Coalition Network Betweenness - - - 0.108*** 
(0.024) 
- 0.120*** 
(0.026) 
7.745*** 
(1.911) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
0.000 
Frequent Communication Network  
     Betweenness 
3.138* 
(1.362) 
3.138* 
(1.374) 
3.109* 
(1.264) 
4.554*** 
(1.296) 
3.432** 
(1.279) 
5.500*** 
(1.225) 
4.440** 
(1.296) 
0.014 
(0.021) 
11.304 
Number of Registered Lobbyists 
   (Average per Six-Month Period) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.007) 
0.020** 
(0.007) 
0.015** 
(0.008) 
- 0.018** 
(0.008) 
3.525 
(4.116) 
19.565 
Political Party Lean 
   (5-point scale, 1=Democratic, 5=Republican)  
0.090 
(0.071) 
0.090 
(0.071) 
0.086 
(0.070) 
0.118 
(0.068) 
0.100 
(0.070) 
0.069 
(0.068) 
0.112 
(0.069) 
3.399 
(0.895) 
11.304 
Endorser of Medicare Modernization Act  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
0.320* 
(0.151) 
0.320* 
(0.152) 
0.346* 
(0.152) 
0.237 
(0.142) 
0.323* 
(0.150) 
0.298* 
(0.146) 
0.277 
(0.144) 
0.461 
(0.500) 
0.000 
Represents Medical Doctors  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
-0.496 
(0.257) 
-0.496 
(0.258) 
-0.487 
(0.258) 
-0.573* 
(0.246) 
-0.526* 
(0.256) 
-0.442 
(0.247) 
-0.557* 
(0.248) 
0.078 
(0.269) 
0.000 
Represents Home Care Industry  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
-0.703 
(0.376) 
-0.703 
(0.376) 
-0.691 
(0.373) 
-0.684 
(0.355) 
-0.672 
(0.368) 
-0.679 
(0.361) 
-0.651 
(0.357) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
0.000 
Represents Hospitals  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
0.005 
(0.371) 
0.006 
(0.373) 
-0.039 
(0.370) 
-0.123 
(0.351) 
-0.006 
(0.366) 
0.082 
(0.350) 
-0.098 
(0.353) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
0.000 
Represents Insurance Companies  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
0.852** 
(0.262) 
0.853** 
(0.262) 
0.858** 
(0.257) 
0.837** 
(0.243) 
0.841** 
(0.253) 
0.892*** 
(0.248) 
0.853*** 
(0.245) 
0.078 
(0.269) 
0.000 
Represents Pharmaceutical Manufacturers  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
0.932*** 
(0.233) 
0.932*** 
(0.234) 
0.937*** 
(0.230) 
0.884*** 
(0.215) 
0.959*** 
(0.227) 
1.015*** 
(0.218) 
0.950*** 
(0.219) 
0.096 
(0.295) 
0.000 
Represents Pharmacists or Pharmacies  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
0.641** 
(0.222) 
0.641** 
(0.222) 
0.669** 
(0.212) 
0.611** 
(0.201) 
0.669** 
(0.221) 
0.668** 
(0.205) 
0.671** 
(0.203) 
0.113 
(0.317) 
0.000 
Constant 6.180 
(6.234) 
6.182 
(6.275) 
15.215 
(551.617) 
16.017 
(348.057) 
14.934 
(463.523) 
16.926 
(347.707) 
18.090 
(934.729) 
- - 
Table D1 is continued on next page 
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Table D1.  Continued from previous page 
 
R 147.438 147.812 1,133,014 3,290,370 937,287 6,351,167 26,100,000 - - 
 (891.810) (899.032) (6.25x108) (1.15x109) (4.34x108) (2.21 x109) (44x1010) - - 
S 2.317 2.317 2.247 2.520 2.320 2.424 2.497 - - 
 (0.438) (0.444) (0.321) (0.366) (0.336) (0.351) (0.364) - - 
Log Likelihood -745.501 -745.509 -744.106 -735.595 -743.031 -736.472 -734.790 - - 
Likelihood Ratio 𝜒2 65.41*** 65.41*** 76.63*** 100.29*** 80.57*** 95.75*** 101.12*** - - 
Likelihood Ratio Degrees of Freedom 10 11 11 11 12 12 13   
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.010, * p ≤ 0.050; Number of Groups = 115; Number of Periods = 2; Dependent variable mean = 18.296, std. dev. = 16.677. 
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Table D2.  Regression Model of Change in Interest Group Influence with Communication Network 
Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors 
Independent Variable (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
Percent 
Imputed 
Change in Number of Coalitions 
- 
0.011 
(0.185) - - 
0.018 
(0.187) 
-0.297 
(0.161) 
-0.280 
(0.161) 
2.557 
(2.570) 0.00 
Change in Average Coalition Size 
- - 
-0.010 
(0.044) - 
-0.012 
(0.044) - 
-0.035 
(0.039) 
5.647 
(7.214) 0.00 
Change in Coalition Network Betweenness 
- - - 
111.647*** 
(18.569) - 
131.363*** 
(16.158) 
132.966*** 
(16.735) 
0.001 
(0.014) 0.00 
Change in Communication Network Betweenness 67.320* 
(25.571) 
67.370* 
(25.956) 
67.715* 
(25.722) 
81.705** 
(25.938) 
67.849* 
(26.288) 
82.888*** 
(22.985) 
84.497*** 
(23.324) 
0.001 
(0.016) 11.304 
Change in Number of Lobbyists 
   (Average Number per Six-Month Period) 
0.077 
(0.123) 
0.078 
(0.126) 
0.079 
(0.124) 
0.098 
(0.108) 
0.081 
(0.128) 
0.070 
(0.105) 
0.079 
(0.107) 
0.460 
(2.284) 20.00 
Political Party Lean 
   (5-point scale, 1=Democratic, 5=Republican)  
-0.423 
(0.435) 
-0.420 
(0.440) 
-0.423 
(0.438) 
-0.528 
(0.384) 
-0.419 
(0.442) 
-0.629 
(0.386) 
-0.629 
(0.386) 
3.398 
(0.909) 11.304 
Endorser of Medicare Modernization Act  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
-0.980 
(0.845) 
-0.992 
(0.848) 
-0.940 
(0.855) 
-0.875 
(0.786) 
-0.953 
(0.858) 
-0.558 
(0.803) 
-0.439 
(0.812) 
0.461 
(0.501) 0.00 
Represents Medical Doctors  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
1.284 
(1.385) 
1.266 
(1.441) 
1.234 
(1.410) 
0.818 
(1.456) 
1.199 
(1.480) 
1.208 
(1.385) 
1.008 
(1.419) 
0.078 
(0.270) 0.00 
Represents Home Care Industry  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
2.875* 
(1.223) 
2.871* 
(1.239) 
2.923* 
(1.222) 
2.536 
(1.359) 
2.922* 
(1.229) 
2.583 
(1.332) 
2.734* 
(1.276) 
0.035 
(0.184) 0.00 
Represents Hospitals  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
-1.187 
(1.512) 
-1.194 
(1.545) 
-1.217 
(1.516) 
0.914 
(1.806) 
-1.232 
(1.558) 
1.466 
(1.810) 
1.386 
(1.788) 
0.035 
(0.184) 0.00 
Represents Insurance Companies  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
4.662*** 
(1.185) 
4.632** 
(1.395) 
4.664*** 
(1.193) 
4.640*** 
(1.114) 
4.615** 
(1.407) 
5.444*** 
(1.268) 
5.403*** 
(1.280) 
0.078 
(0.270) 0.00 
Represents Pharmaceutical Manufacturers  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
-3.584*** 
(0.865) 
-3.612** 
(1.059) 
-3.535*** 
(0.892) 
-3.764*** 
(0.889) 
-3.572** 
(1.065) 
-3.081** 
(0.973) 
-2.961** 
(0.994) 0.096 0.00 
Represents Pharmacists or Pharmacies  
   (Yes=1, No = 0) 
5.261*** 
(0.928) 
5.233*** 
(1.097) 
5.342*** 
(1.013) 
5.098*** 
(0.835) 
5.307*** 
(1.141) 
5.809*** 
(0.951) 
6.035*** 
(1.007) 
(0.113) 
(0.318) 0.00 
Constant -1.260 
(1.417) 
-1.283 
(1.444) 
-1.224 
(1.463) 
-0.990 
(1.119) 
-1.257 
(1.479) 
-0.334 
(1.139) 
-0.246 
(1.166) - - 
F-test statistic 12.99*** 11.63*** 11.58*** 14.47*** 10.40*** 18.31*** 15.62*** - - 
F degrees of freedom (10,104) (11,103) (11,103) (11,103) (12, 102) (12, 102) (13, 101)   
R2 0.366 0.366 0.366 0.471 0.366 0.489 0.492 - - 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.010, * p ≤ 0.050; Number of Groups = 115; Number of Periods = 1; Dependent variable mean = -2.504, std. dev=4.504. 
 
